Canada 1812-1814: Swiss Regiments

The attack has to start at 2 a.m. and is supposed to owe its success to the surprise effect. Drummond gives a curious instruction to his right column, i.e. to remove the flints (silex) from the firelocks (of the guns). Is it because he wants to avoid any shot by accident while approaching, or does he mistrust the Watteville Rgt? It seems that he considers the Watteville Rgt as his poorest troops because of its heterogeneous composition, and it was not British, I guess…

It is two in the morning. Three hundred yards away from Snake Hill, a picket of 100 Americans hears the Right column approaching and sounds the alarm. Surprise, the key of Drummond’s attack has not been achieved. Towson’s artillery is already in action. The British are illuminated while attacking with their bayonets against the formidable abatis, tree trunks, their branches cut off three feet above the base, pointing in all directions. At the palisades, they note that their ladders are too short because they have not taken into account the ditches. Unable to breach this defence, Fischer’s men try to take the defenders from the rear, that is through the water of Lake Erie. But the current is swift, many men are carried away and the ones who have managed to penetrate the American defences are killed or captured. Five times Fischer’s column charges the parapet before he gives up (Berton ).

In the centre and at the left, the Americans resist. The battle seesaws until, suddenly, beneath their feet comes a trembling followed by a roar and a huge explosion. The magazine in the northern bastion has been blown up, either by accident or design. The carnage is ghastly, says Berton. The Americans, protected by the walls, are spared, but the British attackers are torn, crushed, mangled. And that was the end of the British August attack.

General Drummond was quick to shift most of the blame to de Watteville’s Regiment. In a letter to Sir George Prevost on the day following the event, he wrote bitterly: “Thus by the misconduct of this foreign corps has the opportunity been totally lost for the present of striking such a blow at the enemy’s force in this neighbourhood as would altogether prevent his appearing again in any force on the Niagara frontier, at least during the present campain”. But Prevost was not so certain that the blame lay entirely with the Regiment. He answered: “I view with pain the agony of mind you experience from the unfortunate termination of the night attack you had been induced to make on the 15th, and would gladly soothe your feelings on the occasion…but all I have heard since has confirmed my prejudice to highly important operations performed in the dark. Too much was required from de Watteville’s Regiment so situated and deprived, as I am told they were, of their flints. The attempt has proved a costly experiment, and its results will be severely felt”. The great authority on the British army, Sir J. W. Fortescue, in commenting on this operation supports Prevost’s opinion regarding night attacks. He writes: “Night attacks upon fortified positions are in the last degree hazardous and uncertain, and this particular night attack was a disastrous failure”. (All three quotations: John D. P. Martin ).

Historians on both sides, American and British, judge Drummond’s plan severely. It was, indeed, a hastily planned attack, with poor intelligence (e.g. the ladders!) and no previous reconnaissance. He had no artillery support in favour of his right column, and gave that disastrous order to remove the flints (all except one third, says John D. P. Martin). The failure was programmed. Indeed, no one of the principles of any attack was granted: no movement (the abatis), no fire (flints nor artillery) no possible shock, (and no surprise, although planned). Drummond’s fatal gambling on the effect of surprise was paid with human lives.

In the Anglo-Saxon literature, one can still read here and there that the Watteville’s Regiment was a troop of second quality, and that it had many deserters at Fort Erie. (There is no doubt the morale was at its lowest level after the failure of Fort Erie). Mermet (who reported about Oswego) even mentions rumours that the Regiment had started a mutiny. Those reports of Mermet’s seem to be unfounded, at least no author confirms them except Desmond Morton who gives no source and adds “that others were little better”. Yet, this previous statement regarding the deserters of de Watteville’s may be less erroneous for the following month of September (55 deserters, according to US sources [Whitehorne ], = ratio of about 4%, which I consider as still normal in those years). But in the August 15 attack, de Watteville’s had only 7 deserters, while the Glengarries, regular Canadian troops, that were maintained in the reserve had 15 (however only 11 in September). There were 83 men captured by the Americans in the attack, and 8 officers, 11 sergeants and 7 corporals in September. Among them, our young Lt Mermet. The British lost 900 men in the attack and later some 500 more (Berton ). (There is a controversy in the ciphers, depending on the sources (US vs GB) quoted. All however agree about the 83 men captured. Also see Document Return of Casualties of the Right Division, dated Sept. 20, 1814, in Appendix III).